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NEW TORT RULES FOR UNMARRIED PARTNERS: THE
ENHANCED POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESSFUL LOSS OF
CONSORTIUM AND NIED CLAIMS BY SAME SEX
PARTNERS IN NEW MEXICO AFTER LOZOYA
FLYNN SYLVEST*
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 24, 2003, the New Mexico Supreme Court produced a new consortium
rule in Lozoya v. Sanchez.' Lozoya made New Mexico the first state in the nation to
recognize a consortium claim brought by an unmarried cohabitant to a tort victim.2
The court allowed Sara Lozoya's claim for loss of consortium 3 on the basis of
domestic partnership 4 and devised a test for assessing loss of consortium claims for
a series of "spouse/partner"5 relationships. 6 Lozoya's new consortium rule paved the
way for consortium claims brought by same sex partners in New Mexico and
indicated a likely change to the relationship requirement of the New Mexico
negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) rule.7
First, this Note will describe the procedural posture and the facts of the
consortium issue of two claims addressed in the case. Next, this Note provides a full
discussion of the court's rationale for extending consortium to a new class of
plaintiffs, including a detailed description of Lozoya's new consortium rule. The
analysis section briefly outlines the history of New Mexico consortium law and
develops the two major policy themes from the Lozoya consortium ruling: 8 scope
of liability and marriage policy. Finally, two implications are addressed: (1) a likely
change in the relationship requirement of New Mexico's NIED rule and (2) the
availability of the consortium claim, and potentially the NIED claim, to same sex
couples.
H. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ubaldo Lozoya suffered a disabling back injury after two rear-end collisions that
occurred within a ten-month period in 1999 and 2000.' Each collision resulted in
legal claims that were consolidated into a single lawsuit.' "At the time of the first

* Class of 2005, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. 2003-NMSC-009, 66 P.3d 948.
2. Id. 1 1, 17, 66 P.3d at 951, 954. Before overruled, Butcher v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Ct.
App. 1983), overruled by Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 590 (Cal. 1988), allowed unmarried cohabitants to claim
consortium.
3. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009 1, 66 P.3d at 951.
4. One term the court used for Sara and Ubaldo's relationship was "domestic partnership." Id. 9, 66 P.3d
at 952.
5. The court described the class of plaintiffs covered by the Lozoya test as "spouse/partner[s]." Id. 29 n.5,
66 P.3d at 958 n.5.
6. Id. 27, 66 P.3d at 957.
7. For the New Mexico negligent infliction of emotional distress rule, see Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M.
538, 541, 673 P.2d 822, 825 (1983), overruled in part by Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457, 460, 797 P.2d 246, 249
(1990). NIED also involves a requirement for an "intimate family relationship." Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541,673 P.2d
at 825.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, f 2,6-7,66 P.3d at 951.
10. Id. 111, 66 P.3d at 952.
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accident, Ubaldo lived in a domestic partnership with Sara Lozoya, [but] they were
not married."" Between the two accidents, Sara and Ubaldo did marry. 2 The trial
"court granted a directed verdict [on the consortium claim for] the first accident
because [Sara and Ubaldo] were not legally married at the time."' 3 The court of
appeals certified Lozoya for
the New Mexico Supreme Court because of the
"substantial public interest"'' 4 in whether unmarried cohabitants should be entitled
to recover consortium. ' The supreme court reversed
the trial court's directed verdict
16
on the consortium claim and remanded the claim.
Before the first accident, Sara and Ubaldo had an intimate relationship 7 and were
happy in their relationship with each other. 8 They had "'been together' for over 30
years. ' 9 They had lived in the house they purchased together for fifteen years."
"They had three children together," used "the same last name and had filed joint tax
returns since at least 1997. 2I' They went dancing and visited friends together.
"After the first accident ....
Ubaldo became depressed. '23 Sara and Ubaldo's
relationship "changed dramatically. '24 Ubaldo's pain caused by injuries from the
accident significantly affected the couple's social life.25 Ubaldo "stay[ed] in bed
quite a bit,' 26 and the couple's social life and sex life "diminished. 27 Even though
their relationship had changed significantly, Sara and Ubaldo married about six
months after the first accident occurred.28
II1. THE COURT'S RATIONALE
The court concluded, among other things, that "consortium is not limited to
married partners., 29 This Note addresses the rationale behind that decision. First, the
court acknowledged that New Mexico did not recognize any kind of consortium
claim until Romero v. Byers30 allowed a spousal consortium claim in 1994.31 Romero

11. Id. 9,66P.3dat952.
12. Id. 1 14, 66 P.3d at 953.
13. Id. 111, 66 P.3d at 952. Only the consortium claim from the first accident is at issue in this note, but four
issues came up on appeal: (1)the trial court's directed verdict disallowing the consortium claim in the first accident
at issue in this note, (2) the trial court's judgment of no negligence in the second accident, (3) the trial court's
exclusion of evidence that Ubaldo had a vehicle repossessed and that foreclosure proceedings had begun on the
Lozoya home, and (4) the trial court's refusal of plaintiffs special verdict form. Id. 13, 66 P.3d at 952-53.
14. Id. 1,66 P.3d at 950.
15.

Id.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. f 1,31, 66 P.3d at 951, 958.
Id. 10, 66 P.3d at 952.
Id. Ubaldo testified that he and Sara were happy together before the accidents. id.
Id. 1 9,66 P.3d at 952.
Id.

21.

Id.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. 1 10, 66 P.3d at 952.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. 9, 66 P.3d at 952.
Id. 11, 66 P.3d at 951.
117 N.M. 422, 872 P.2d 840 (1994).
Lozoya, 1 15, 66 P.3d at 953 (citing Romero, 117 N.M. 422, 872 P.2d 840).
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made New Mexico the last state in the nation to recognize spousal consortium. 32 The
Lozoya court noted that Romero came to its conclusion by using "the working
definition ' 33 of New Mexico's "modem duty rule. 34 The Lozoya court restated the
duty rule used in Romero, quoting excerpts from Solon v. WEK Drilling Co. 35 and
Calkins v. Cox Estates.36

The excerpt from Solon underscored the relationship between forseeability and
' 37
duty. "If it is found that a plaintiff, and injury to that plaintiff, were foreseeable,
then the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff.38 Calkins added that forseeability is
determined by whether the plaintiff is "within the zone of danger created by [the
tortfeasor' s] actions."39 Beyond this, the court noted that New Mexico's duty rule
also includes consideration of policy factors. Specifically, the court stated that the
duty rule asks whether there are policy reasons to prevent imposing a duty even
when the plaintiff is foreseeable.' The court emphasized a "conspicuous[]"'"
absence of any legal status requirement for the relationship between a plaintiff and
the tort victim in the duty standard.42
Despite the fact that New Mexico was the last state in the country to recognize
spousal consortium,

43

in Fernandezv. Walgreen's Hastings Co.," it became the first

jurisdiction to allow grandparents to bring consortium claims "in certain circumstances. 45 Referring again to the duty standard, the court pointed out that Fernandez
held that "it can be foreseeable that negligently causing the death of a twenty-twomonth-old child will cause emotional distress to a grandparent who had a close
familial relationship with the child." 46
The fundamental question that the court next considered was whether the
reasoning in Romero and Fernandezcould be used to extend the consortium benefit
to unmarried cohabitants. 47 The court started its analysis by noting that no state in

32. Romero, 117 N.M. at 425 n.l, 872 P.2d at 843 n.,cited in Lozoya, 16, 66 P.3d at 953.
33. Id. 1 15, 66 P.3d at 953.
34. Id.
35. 113 N.M. 566, 829 P.2d 645 (1992); Romero, 117 N.M. at 425-26, 872 P.2d at 843-44 (citing Solon,
113 N.M. at 569, 829 P.2d at 648 (holding consortium claim by parents of an adult child invalid)), quotedin Lozoya,
2003-NMSC-009, 15, 66 P.3d at 953.
36. 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36 (1990); Romero, 117 N.M. at 425-26, 872 P.2d at 843-44 (citing Calkins,
110 N.M. at 61-62, 792 P.2d at 38-39), quoted in Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 15, 66 P.3d at 953.
37. Solon, 113 N.M. 566,569,829 P.2d 645,648, cited in Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 15,66 P.3d at 953.
38. Id.
39. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 61-62,792 P.2d at 38-39, cited in Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009,1 15,66 P.3d at 953.
40. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 1 15, 66 P.3d at 953 (citing Torres v. State, 119 N.M. 609,611-12, 894 P.2d
386,388-89 (1995), overruled on other grounds by Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 2003-NMSC-018, 23 n.3, 73 P.3d
181, 192 n.3).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. 16, 66 P.3d at 953 (citing Romero, 117 N.M. at 425 n.1, 872 P.2d at 843 n. 1).
44. 1998-NMSC-039, 968 P.2d 774.
45. Id. 1 16, 66 P.3d at 953 (citing Fernandez, 1998-NMSC-039, 968 P.2d 774).
46. Id. 1 16,66 P.3d at 953 (citing Fernandez, 1998-NMSC-39,1 31,968 P.2d at 784). The Fernandezcourt
granted consortium to the grandmother based on her role as familial caretaker to her minor grandchild. Fernandez,
1998-NMSC-039, 1 11, 968 P.2d at 784.
47. Id. 1 17, 66 P.3d at 954.
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the country has recognized consortium for unmarried partners.4 Despite the absence
of state court precedent, the court did find "guidance"4 9 for its consortium ruling.5 °
The court observed that "many courts have wrestled with this issue" and provided
"thorough and thoughtful analysis."5 The New Mexico court specifically referred
to Trombley v. Starr-Wood CardiacGroup, PC,5" which presented the arguments on
both sides regarding consortium for unmarried cohabitants.53 The facts in Trombley
allowed the Alaska court to avoid ruling on the consortium issue,54 but the Trombley
opinion suggested that it found "persuasive arguments on both sides."55 Given the
absence of favorable state court precedent, Lozoya found this observation significant
enough to mention. The New Mexico court also identified two opinions discussed
in Trombley, Butcher v. Superior Court 6 and Elden v. Sheldon. 7 Butcher allowed
an unmarried cohabitant to bring a consortium claim, 58 but the California Supreme
Court overturned that decision in Elden.59
In addition to the arguments from Butcher and Elden, the court explained that it
found guidance in an academic article by Barbara Cox. 6° The Cox article discussed
a changing definition of family in modem society and argued that "alternative

48. Id. Two federal court rulings allowed consortium for unmarried cohabitants. See Sutherland v. Auch
Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (holding party could claim consortium where party
was engaged at time of injury and married shortly after); Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980)
(holding that an unmarried cohabitant may state a cause of action for loss of consortium). The Plaintiff cited other
federal cases that were not quite on point because they involved injury that occurred before marriage but was not
discovered until after marriage. Plaintiff-Appellants' Reply Brief at 1, Lozoya (No. 22,717). Lozoya addressed
Sutherland and the premarital latent injury cases in the context of a footnote dealing with timing problems in
jurisdictions that do not recognize loss of consortium claims for unmarried couples. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009,
20 n.2, 66 P.3d at 955 n.2. Lozoya aimed to prevent the timing difficulties associated with loss of consortium claims
by spouse/partners with a rule that did not require marital status. Thus, the timing of the injury relative to a date of
marriage would not be a dispositive issue. Id.
49. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 17, 66 P.3d at 954.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 3 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2000).
53. Id., quoted in Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 1 17, 66 P.3d at 954.
54. Id. at 922-23. Dale Trombley brought a loss of consortium claim after Barbara Trombley was injured
during heart surgery. Id. at 918. Barbara and Dale were not married to each other at the time of Barbara's surgery.
See id. At that time, Barbara and Dale were cohabitating, id., but Barbara was married to another man, Keith
Bradrick. Id. at 922. Mr. Bradrick had Alzheimer's "and was living in a critical care facility." Id. Barbara visited
Keith and assisted in his care. Id. The court found that both Dale and Keith would have a basis for the loss of
consortium claim but ruled against Dale's claim because of the existence of the marriage to Keith when the injury
occurred. Id. at 923. Trombley did not decide the question of consortium for unmarried cohabitants because both
the de facto and de jure spouse could have recovered. Lozoya followed Trombley's requirement that only one
plaintiff should be able to make a spouse/partner consortium claim. 2003-NMSC-009, 1 29, 66 P.3d at 958.
55. Trombley, 3 P.3d at 923, quoted in Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 18, 66 P.3d at 954.
56. 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Ct. App. 1983), overruled by Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 590 (Cal. 1988).
57. Elden, 758 P.2d 582; see Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 1 17,66 P.3d at 954 (citing Butcher, 188 Cal. Rptr.
503, overruled by Elden, 758 P.2d 582). The Plaintiffs argued that the court should follow Butcher without
referencing Elden. Id. 1 17 n. 1, 66 P.3d at 954 n. 1. The court included a note that it "caution[ed] counsel that the
knowing failure to mention [the Elden] authority would violate Rule 16-303(A)(3) NMRA 2003...." Id. (citation
omitted).
58. Butcher, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 503, cited in Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 17, 66 P.3d at 954.
59. Elden, 758 P.2d at 590.
60. Barbara J. Cox, Alternative Families: Obtaining Traditional Family Benefits Through Litigation,
Legislationand Collective Bargaining, 15 Wis. WOMEN's LJ. 93, 133-37 (2000), cited in Lozoya, 2003-NMSC009, 17, 66 P.3d at 954.
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families"'" should have legal protections equal to those given traditional families.62
The court weighed the policy arguments for and against consortium for unmarried
cohabitants found in all those sources and concluded that the most persuasive
arguments favored consortium "claim[s] by unmarried cohabitants in certain
circumstances. 63
The court organized its rationale for this conclusion by rejecting five arguments
raised by the Defendants from the first accident in Lozoya: (1) "[A] legal relationship has always been a limiting factor" in consortium cases, 64 (2) "Legal
status.. .provide[s] courts with clear guidance as to who should recover,"'65 (3)
66
Parties who get the benefits of marriage should also have to assume the burdens,
(4) Recognizing a cause of action for Sara Lozoya is "the equivalent of recognizing
common law marriage, '' 67 and (5) Recognizing a cause of action for unmarried
cohabitants would create an unworkable standard that offers insufficient guidelines
to lower courts.68
The first two arguments the court addressed dealt with legal status. The
Defendants argued that Fernandez specifically required "special legal status" in a
loss of consortium claim.' The Defendants emphasized that Fernandez referred to
a legislative decision to allow visitation rights for "grandparents of minor
children. 70 In response, the Lozoya court clarified that the significance of
grandparental visitation rights in Fernandez was the recognition of "the importance
of the grandparent-grandchild relationship. '71 Fernandez did not create a requirement for legal status.7 ' The Lozoya opinion, however, did underscore that legal
status added weight to the recognition that grandparents can have a quality of
relationship with their minor grandchildren that warrants claims for loss of
consortium. 73 The emphasis in Fernandez was on the quality of the relationship.
The Defendants more generally asserted that legal status must be used to set a
reasonable limit on the field of potential consortium claimants. 74 They cautioned that
abandoning the bright-line standard of a legally recognized relationship could lead
to opening up the consortium claim to a range of plaintiffs who have only remote
relationships with tort victims. 75 The court characterized this position as reflective
of an interest in finding a way to easily "dispose of many claims. ' 76 At the outset,

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 17, 66 P.3d at 954.
64. Id. 18, 66 P.3d at 954.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. 19, 66 P.3d at 954.
70. Id. (citing NMSA 1978, § 40-9-2(A) (1999)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. As long as a plaintiff proves caretaker status, even plaintiffs not related by blood or marriage to the
child victim could claim consortium under Fernandez.See infra notes 192-196 and accompanying text.

74. Id. 20, 66 P.3d at 954-55.
75. Id. Defendants argued that "cousins, co-workers, drinking buddies, softball team members," or
adulterous partners might all become potential consortium claimants. Id.
76. Id.
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the court answered this argument in brief terms, stating, "Ease of administration...does not necessarily further the interests of justice."77 The court acknowledged, however, that the need to "limit[] the field of potential claimants" is "perhaps
the most significant78reason that many courts allow only spouses to make a loss of
consortium claim.
To further consider this problem, the court expanded its consideration of
precedent to NIED cases. 79 The court concluded that NIED claims are sufficiently
similar to consortium claims to make policy comparisons. 80 The court noted that
"the same policies are implicated by broadening the field of potential claimants for
each" kind of claim.8 1 Having set up this framework for rough equivalency between
NIED and consortium claims, the court drew heavily on the analysis from an NIED
82
case decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court, Dunphy v. Gregor.
The Dunphy court rejected the argument that NIED claims would expand in an
unlimited manner without a "bright line" standard requiring a legally recognized
relationship. 3 Dunphy concluded that there are "principles of tort law" that are more
important than bright line distinctions.' Lozoya parallels this view with its reference
to the "interests of justice. 8 5 Dunphy found a solution to unlimited expansion of86
NIED claims in "the 'sedulous application' of the principles of tort law,
emphasizing "fairness" ' 87 to plaintiffs as well as defendants.88
Lozoya adopted another view articulated by the Dunphy court. Dunphy held that
the main concern in NIED recovery is "to assure that resulting emotional injury is
genuine and deserving of compensation."89 In this context, Dunphy emphasized that
juries should undertake "sound assessment of the quality of interpersonal relationships." 9 The Lozoya court applied the Dunphy logic to consortium. In short, Lozoya
found that legal status is not dispositive but serves as evidence that there is an
interpersonal relationship of the quality that warrants recovery in consortium. 9'
Taking another conclusion from Dunphy, Lozoya held that duty questions in
consortium cases must sometimes be left to juries. 92 The court explained, "Although
imposition of a duty is a legal question for the court, oftentimes it is dependent on
a factual determination, which we entrust to the jury."93 The court noted that

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. 21, 66 P.3d at 955-56.
80. Id. 21, 66 P.3d at 955 (citing Elden, 758 P.2d 582).
81. Id.
82. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994), cited in Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 9121, 66 P.3d at 955.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 120, 66 P.3d at 955; see supra note 77 and accompanying text.
86. Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 376.
87. Id. at 376.
88. See id. "Sedulous" is defined as "diligent" and "painstaking." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 658
(Langenscheidt ed. 1994).
89. Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378, quoted in Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 21, 66 P.3d at 955.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 1 19, 66 P.3d at 954; see Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378.
92. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 21, 66 P.3d at 955-56.
93. Id. 9121, 66 P.3d at 955 (citing Sarracino v. Martinez, 117 N.M. 193, 194-95, 870 P.2d 155, 156-57
(N.M. Ct. App. 1994)).
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allowing juries to conduct an aspect of the duty analysis would be "appropriate... with proper guidance from the court"' and elaborated a series of threshold
requirements to screen out claims that juries would not hear.95
The third argument the Defendants asserted was that it was unfair to give a
marriage benefit to a couple that has not assumed the burdens of marriage.96 The
court responded to this argument in two ways. First, the court conceded that Sara
Lozoya did not have the burdens of marriage at the time of the first accident but
emphasized that she also did not have the corresponding benefits of marriage. 7
The Defendants provided a list of marital burdens and argued that Sara Lozoya
should be expected to have assumed these burdens in order to bring a claim for loss
of consortium. These burdens included (1) the commitment to pay Ubaldo' s debts, 98
(2) the commitment to leave "a share of her estate to Ubaldo" upon her death, 99 (3)
the obligation to pay joint income taxes,' ° and (4) the obligation to undergo the
process of divorce should she formally want to leave the relationship with Ubaldo 10 '
The court accepted these assertions of the marital burdens but pointed out that all
of the burdens of marriage "have.. .corresponding benefit[s]."'' 2 The court highlighted that, prior to marriage, Sara could not require Ubaldo to share his property,
to pay her debts, to leave her a portion of his estate nor undergo a divorce should he
want to leave the relationship with her. 0 3 The court concluded that Sara was as
much deprived of the benefits, as she was free of the burdens."
The court's second and more decisive response to Defendant's argument was that
consortium is not a benefit of marriage but "a method of compensation for one who
has suffered the loss of a significant relational interest."'0 5 The court concluded that
recognizing the consortium claim did not give Sara a benefit of marriage without
demanding a fair price, because consortium is not a marital benefit but compensation for a relational loss."3 6
The Defendants next argued that allowing Sara Lozoya's consortium claim would
be equivalent to recognizing common law marriage.'0 7 In response, the court concluded that extending the consortium claim would not create a conflict with New
Mexico precedent against recognition of common law marriage.'0 8 Reempha-

94. Id.
95. See id. 29, 66 P.3d at 958. The court called these requirements "further limits" that restrict which
couples can claim consortium. Id. These three requirements establish the first element needed for bringing the loss
of consortium claim-that a couple has an intimate familial relationship. If a jury determines that the intimate
familial relationship is significant enough, the claim is warranted. See infra notes 124-129 and accompanying text.
96. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 22, 66 P.3d at 956.
97. Id. U 22-23, 66 P.3d at 956.
98. Id. 22, 66 P.3d at 956.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101.

Id.

102. Id. 23, 66 P.3d at 956.
103.

Id.

104. Id.
105. Id.

106.
107.
108.
Davis, 100

Id.
Id. W 18, 24, 66 P.3d at 954, 956.
Id. 9 24, 66 P.3d at 956 (citing In re Gabaldon's Estate, 38 N.M. 392, 34 P.2d 672 (1934); Merrill v.
N.M. 552, 553, 673 P.2d 1285, 1286 (1983)). New Mexico recognizes common law marriage "validly

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 34

sizing that consortium is not a benefit of marriage, the court noted that extending
consortium to unmarried cohabitants would not confer benefits or burdens of
marriage. 0 As a result, Lozoya did not upset the state's "nonrecognition of common
law marriage.""
Finally, Defendants asserted that extending consortium to unmarried couples
would create an unworkable standard for lower courts to follow in future consortium
claims."' This unworkable standard argument is very similar to earlier arguments2
that the court addressed concerning unlimited expansion of the consortium claim."
The court responded to this concern by concluding that it could avoid the hazard of
creating an unworkable standard by "providing sufficient guidance to lower
courts."",13

The test created by the Lozoya court requires that a couple in a consortium action
can prove an intimate family relationshipthat is significant enough to warrant the
claim. Courts will assess whether there is sufficient evidence for reasonable juries
to find that both these elements are met." 4 Lozoya gives juries the final role in
determining the presence of a duty. The court explained, "Although imposition of
it is dependent on a factual determination,
a duty is a legal question,... oftentimes
5
which we entrust to the jury."''
Intimate family relationship under Lozoya is based on three relationship requirements that specifically apply to 6couples (other terms used by the court included
"spouse/partner[]" relationships" and "domestic partners[]"' 17). The court required
that each Lozoya plaintiff must have a relationship with the victim that (1) is
exclusive, (2) is committed, and (3) only one plaintiff can claim." 8 The court
described this third requirement in the context of an explanation that a plaintiff cannot be married to someone other than the tort victim."' The court stated that "a
person120can only have an intimate familial relationship with one other person at [a]
time."
The court's expectation that all couples bringing consortium claims meet the three
relationship requirements is inferred from two points. First, the court explained that
certain couples get a presumption of an intimate family relationship.' 2' Second, the
court noted that couples that do not get the presumption have to prove they have

entered into in another state." Id. 24 n.4, 66 P.3d at 956 n.4 (citing NMSA 1978, § 40-1-4 (1953)).
109. Id. 24, 66 P.3d at 956.
110.

Id.

111. Id. (fi 18, 26, 66 P.3d at 954, 957.
112. See supra notes 74-91 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding Defendants' arguments on the
need for a bright line rule based on legal status.
113. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 26, 66 P.3d at 957.
114. See id.126, 31, 66 P.3d at 957-58.
115. Id. 21, 66 P.3d at 955.
116. Id. 29 n.5, 66 P.3d at 958 n.5.
117. Id. 9 9, 66 P.3d at 952.
118. The court drew these three requirements from Trombley. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 1 29,66 P.3d at 958
(citing Trombley, 3 P.3d at 923); see supra note 54. Trombley referred to the requirements of commitment and
exclusivity but also barred a claim by a committed, exclusive nonmarital partner where there was a marriage to a
third party. Trombley, 3 P.3d at 923.
119. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 29, 66 P.3d at 958.
120. Id.

121. Id.

27, 29, 66 P.3d at 957-58.
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committed, exclusive relationships. 2 2 Thus, couples that do get the presumption are
not required to prove they have committed, exclusive relationships. 23 The court did
not describe what happens with the burden of proof for the third requirement, that
there is no marriage to a third party.
It does, however, make it clear that marriage
24
to a third party bars the claim.
The court listed three categories of couples presumed to meet the requirements
for intimate family relationship: (1) couples married, (2) couples engaged, and (3)
couples that meet a "general test for common law marriage."'' 25 Although these
couples do not have to prove that they have an intimate family relationship,
defendants can rebut the presumption by challenging the presence of one or more
of the three basic relationship requirements. 26 Unmarried cohabitants, because they
do not qualify for the presumption, have to prove the presence of an intimate family
relationship by showing a relationship that is exclusive and committed. Given that
it would otherwise bar the claim, it makes sense that they should also have to prove
that only one person could make the claim. 27 Logically, all couples that do not fit
into the list of couples that qualify for the presumption will have to prove the three
relationship requirements.
The presumption of intimate family relationship does not mean that couples from
the three categories will automatically be "entitled to recover" consortium. 128 The
presumption simply enables a claim to make it to a jury unless defendants
successfully rebut the presumption. 29 The jury will use a "myriad of factors" to
assess the quality of the close relationship between the couple and finally determine
if it is "significant enough" to warrant a consortium claim. 30
The court provided two assessment tools to guide this determination. First, the
court decided that the ability of a couple to meet a general test for common law
marriage would serve as "highly probative 131 evidence of a significant enough
relationship to warrant a loss of consortium claim. The court took a general test for
common law marriage from Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson. 32 The
Johnson standard included two elements that have to be met by a preponderance of
evidence: (1) express or implied consent to be married 133 and (2) a mutual
assumption of "marital rights, duties and obligations."' ' The court included couples
that meet the Johnson standard in its list of couples that qualify for the presumption.
If a court finds that a couple shows enough evidence for a jury to find that the
Johnson standard is met, the presumption is warranted. If the jury determines that

122. Id. 1 29, 66 P.3d at 958.
123. See id.
124. Id.

125. Id. T 27, 29, 66 P.3d at 957-58.
126. This is inferred from the fact that the court described three requirements, "further limits," that all Lozoya
plaintiffs must meet. Id. 29, 66 P.3d at 958.
127. See id.
128. Id. 1 27, 66 P.3d at 957.
129. Id. 29, 66 P.3d at 958.
130. Id. 27, 66 P.3d at 957.
131. Id. 25, 66 P.3d at 957.
132. 645 P.2d 356 (Idaho 1982), cited in Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 25, 66 P.3d at 957.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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is met, it is a "great indication" that the relationship is significant
the standard
35
enough.
Second, the court borrowed a list of factors from Dunphy used to assess the
degree of intimacy between couples in NIED claims.'36 The Lozoya court did not
list of all the relevant considerations,
refer to the Dunphy factors as an exhaustive
37
but noted that they "help greatly": 1
[The] standard must take into account the duration of the relationship, the degree
of mutual dependence, the extent of common contributions to a life together, the

extent and quality of shared experience, and.. .whether the plaintiff and the
injured person were members of the same household, their emotional reliance
on each other, the particulars of their day to day relationship, and the manner in
which they related to each other in attending to life's mundane requirements.'38
To summarize the Lozoya test, an intimate family relationship for Lozoya
plaintiffs, all of whom assert spouse/partner relationships to the victim, requires
fulfillment of three basic relationship requirements: exclusivity, commitment, and
a degree of intimacy with the victim only one plaintiff could claim. Three categories
of couples named by the court get the presumption of intimate family relationship,
but defendants can rebut that presumption by showing the absence of one or more
of three basic requirements. Couples that do not get the presumption, including
unmarried cohabitants, must prove they meet the three Lozoya relationship
requirements. If these couples do not show enough evidence to courts that they meet
the basic three requirements, their claims will not go to juries. All couples, even
those that get the presumption, must prove to juries that they have significant
enough relationships to warrant consortium claims. Couples that show courts
enough evidence to satisfy the Johnson common law marriage standard will qualify
for the presumption. If juries find that they do meet the Johnson standard, it weighs
greatly in favor of finding that the relationship is significant enough. The list of
questions from Dunphy will guide the assessment of the significance of the
relationship between all couples that reach juries.'39 Even couples that did not get
the presumption could have valid claims as long as juries finally decide that there
is an intimate family relationship that is significant enough.
Applying the test to Sara and Ubaldo Lozoya, the court found that a reasonable
jury could conclude that Sara and Ubaldo lived together as a "typical married
couple" before their nuptials between the first and second accident. 4° The court
listed the evidence it used to form this conclusion: Sara and Ubaldo (1) lived
together for fifteen years,' 4 ' (2) lived in a house they owned together, 4 2 (3) had three

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 1 24, 66 P.3d at 956.
Id. 27, 66 P.3d at 957.
Id.
Id. 27, 66 P.3d at 957 (alterations in original) (quoting Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378).
See id.
Id. 1 30, 66 P.3d at 958.
Id.
Id.
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children they raised together, 43 (4) shared "the same last name,"'" (5) "generally
enjoyed spending time" together, 45 (6) "participat[ed] in social events as a
couple,"'" (7) represented themselves to others "as a married couple,' 47 and (8)
depended "on each other in their" daily lives.' 8 The court also observed that the
Lozoya' s marriage before the second accident was further evidence of the couple's
"intent to be committed to one another indefinitely."'' 49 The court further noted that
"a reasonable jury could" have decided that the Lozoyas met the Johnson
requirements "for common law marriage."' 5 ° The court concluded that Sara Lozoya
"may be able to present a cognizable claim for loss of consortium."' 5' The court
remanded Sara Lozoya's consortium claim in the first accident for a new trial. 52 A
jury will consider whether the factors listed in Dunphy, as well as the evidence that
the general test for common law marriage is met, show a close enough relationship
for Sara Lozoya to recover for loss of consortium.
IV. ANALYSIS
Lozoya is not the only unique stand that New Mexico has taken in the field of
consortium law. A brief look at the overall development of consortium law in New
Mexico illustrates the New Mexico court's sensitivity to social change and interest
in modem approaches. In Fernandez, New Mexico became the first state to
recognize a claim by a grandparent for loss of a minor grandchild's consortium.'53
Lozoya and Fernandezstood out for being firsts, but even the fact that New Mexico
was the last state in the nation to recognize spousal consortium reflected the New
Mexico court's attunement to changes in society and the responsibility of the
common law to adapt accordingly.
New Mexico originally resisted recognition of the consortium claim, in part,
because it found the cause of action a vestigial link to an outdated concept of the
marital relationship. 54 In Roseberry v. Starkovich, the New Mexico court rejected
the cause of action as a "'fossil from an earlier era....one of a group of archaic
actions based on the notion that the paterfamilias was alone competent to sue for
losses suffered by the family unit .... [and] [t]he husband was entitled to his wife's
service[s],'" which also came to include the loss of sexual relations."'

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.

146. Id.
147. Id. 3 31, 66 P.3d at 958.
148. Id.

149. Id. 30, 66 P.3d at 958. Another fact not listed here, but addressed earlier in the case, was that the
Lozoyas filed joint tax returns even before being married. Id. 1 9, 66 P.3d at 952.
150. Id. 31, 66 P.3d at 958. The court did not require that a couple must meet the Johnson standard to
warrant recovery. It simply stated that meeting Johnson would be "highly probative." See id. 1 25, 66 P.3d at 957.
151. Id. 31,66P.3dat958.
152. Id. 42, 66 P.3d at 961.
153. Fernandez, 1998-NMSC-039, 971
24, 31, 68 P.2d at 782, 784.
154. See Roseberry v. Starkovich, 73 N.M. 211,387 P.2d 321 (1963), overruledby Romero, 117 N.M. at 427,
872 P.2d at 845.
155. Id. at 217-18, 387 P.2d at 326 (quoting Louis L. Jaffe, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 229 (1953)).

Jaffe noted in his assessment of the history of consortium actions that "the sentimental elements of [a wife's] person
and presence" would include more than simply sexual relations. Id. Culhane explained, however, that the first
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In Tondre v. Thurmond-Hollis-Thurmond, Inc.,'15 6 the New Mexico court maintained the theme that refusing to recognize consortium as a cause of action reflected
a "modem" view of the spousal relationship.' 57 The Tondre court observed that the
"wife is an equal partner with the husband in modem society"'' 58 and leveled the
playing field by suggesting that neither spouse should recover consortium as
opposed to permitting both spouses to make consortium claims. 5 9
Notably, one commentator referred to New Mexico's stand against recognition
of any consortium claim in Tondre as a "bold step" that may have been taken with
the awareness that changing perceptions of marriage and relationship would lead to
expansion of the claim.' 6 "The new logic of the [consortium] tort... means that it is
not so neatly cabined by the legal entity of marriage; even if sexual intimacy is
defined as essential to the tort, such intimacy is neither present in all marriages, nor
absent outside of its confines."' 6' The modem definition of consortium, however,
is no longer tied either to the loss of services "analogized to the... loss of a servant' s
services ' nor, necessarily, to the loss of sexual relations. 63 Now more focused on
"intangible" relational loss,"6 the cause of action could potentially cover an
unlimited range of claimants who suffer the loss of a relationship with a tort victim.
The suggestion that New Mexico had set a course to refrain from recognition of
consortium, out of concern that the new emphasis on relational interests created an
unlimited potential for expansion, 65 has proven wrong. The New Mexico court took
a different turn when it decided to recognize spousal consortium in Romero."' The
court remained true to its interest in keeping pace with changes in society and found
that an evolved definition of the consortium claim permitted the court to allow the
a concern about buying in to the rejected
cause of action. Romero did not mention
"archaic" doctrines on marriage. 167
Romero remedied the outdated concept of the action by extending it to both
spouses. Romero articulated the new rule: "Loss of consortium is simply the
emotional distress suffered by one spouse who loses the normal company of his or
her mate...." 168 The Romero court emphasized that previous uncertainty about the
definition of consortium had contributed to the choice not to recognize the cause of
expansion of consortium took place when it began to compensate for the husband's loss of sexual intimacy with
his wife in addition to his loss of her economic service to his household. John G. Culhane, A "Clanging Silence":
Same-Sex Couples and Tort Law, 89 KY. L.J. 911, 949-50 (2000-2001).

156. 103 N.M. 292,706 P.2d 156 (1985), overruled by Romero v. Byers, 117 N.M. 422, 427, 872 P.2d 840,
845 (1994).

157. Id.
158. Id. at 293, 706 P.2d at 157.
159. Id.
160. Culhane, supra note 155, at 950. Culhane also noted the "statutory demise of [consortium] in Great
Britain, its nation of origin." Id. at 950 n. 175.
161. Id. at 950.

162. Id. at 949.
163. Id. at 949. Culhane explained that consortium evolved from the "tort-per quad consortium amisit
... expressly analogized to the cause of action a man had for the loss of a servant's services...." Id. (emphasis
added).
164. Id. at 950.
165. Id.
166. Romero, 117 N.M. 422, 872 P.2d 840.
167. See supranote 155 (referencing Louis L. Jaffee).
168. Romero, 117 N.M. at 425, 872 P.2d at 843.
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action in New Mexico' 69 and held that the new definition was clear enough to allow
it. 70 The Romero court explained that precedent "analyzing.. .non-physical
harms"'17' brought clarity to the consortium claim, giving
the court some basis for
72
assessing and compensating for non-economic losses.1
All of the leading New Mexico consortium cases have focused on policy analysis
tied to closely observing and responding to social realities. 73 Roseberry, Tondre,
and Romero all addressed the issue of extending consortium to spouses in light of
changing ideas about marriage and the ability of courts to respond to the noneconomic aspects of relationship. Although both are groundbreaking decisions,
Lozoya and Fernandez continued on a path already established. Lozoya and
Fernandez each reflected the New Mexico court's interest in assuring that
consortium law remain true to the purpose for the cause of action through
responsiveness to the realities of relationships.
The Fernandezcourt explained that a grandmother, in certain circumstances, had
a basis for claiming consortium, in part because in New Mexico "it is not uncommon for several generations of a family to live in the same home."' 74 The Lozoya
court gave a similar explanation for the choice not to limit the claim to married
partners: "Given the widespread reality and acceptance of unmarried cohabitation,
a reasonable person would not find the.. .emotional trauma [to an unmarried
cohabitant] 'remote and unexpected."",175 The Lozoya court further expressed its
interest in responding to relationships as they actually exist by allowing juries to
assess a "myriad of factors"' 7 6 to determine the degree of intimacy between partners.
As the court observed,
juries "deal[] with the realities [as well as] the legalities of
177
relationships."'
Despite its expansion of the consortium claim, the Lozoya court was clearly
concerned that defendants "should not have the burden of 'fighting off multiple
[consortium claimants].' ' 178 Socio-cultural realities such as those recognized in
Lozoya and Fernandezdo not, in themselves, justify finding that a Defendant owed
a duty of care. Lozoya's statement of the duty rule clearly conveys that, even if a
plaintiff is foreseeable, New Mexico courts will consider policy reasons that might
preclude imposing a duty of care. 17 9 This aspect of the duty rule allows that even
though it may be reasonable to expect that defendants could anticipate injury to

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Solon v. WEK Drilling Co., 113 N.M. 566,829 P.2d 645 (1992); Roseberry, 73 N.M. 211,387
P.2d 321; Tondre, 103 N.M. 292, 706 P.2d 156; Romero, 117 N.M. 422, 872 P.2d 840; Fernandez, 1998-NMSC039, 968 P.2d 774; Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 66 P.3d 948 (each assessing whether policy reasons should preclude
imposition of a duty, even where the plaintiff was foreseeable).
174. Fernandez, 1998-NMSC-039, 31, 968 P.2d at 784.
175. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 26, 66 P.3d at 957 (quoting Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378 (quoting Elden, 758
P.2d at 591 (Broussard, J., dissenting))).
176. Id. 27, 66 P.3d at 957.
177. Id. 21, 66 P.3d at 955 (emphasis added) (quoting Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378).
178. Id. 29, 66 P.3d at 958.
179. Id. 115, 66 P.3d at 953.
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persons who have certain kinds of relationships to a tort victim, there may still be
policy reasons to bar the claims.
The Lozoya Defendants identified five reasons for precluding unmarried partners
from bringing consortium claims.' 80 In response to all of these arguments, the court
addressed two major policy themes. First, three of the Defendants' arguments group
together as issues relating to the need to limit the scope of liability in consortium
actions. These three arguments all point to using the legal status of the relationship
between the plaintiff and the victim as the limiting factor. Second, two of the
Defendants' arguments specifically relate to marriage policy. One argument posited
that it is unfair to extend marital benefits to unmarried partners. The other cautioned
against creating a new consortium rule that would be inconsistent with the state's
choice not to recognize common law marriage.
The court referred to the case law that convinced it to extend the claim to
unmarried partners without specific reference to the arguments it found most
persuasive. 8 ' Comparison and contrast of the Lozoya court's response to the major
policy arguments, with the responses from the case law that influenced its decision,
gives insight into how the court might respond to future efforts to further expand the
consortium claim.
A. The Needfor Containment of the Consortium Claim
The Lozoya court noted that concern about "limiting the field of potential
claimants" was "perhaps the most significant reason that many courts allow only
spouses to make a loss of consortium claim."' 182 Butcher and Elden, the two leading
cases on consortium for unmarried cohabitants the court used for guidance, also
dealt with this concern.' 83 Butcher allowed consortium to unmarried partners, but
both Butcher and Elden took a more conservative approach to the scope of liability
issue than did the New Mexico court.
In Elden, the California court admitted the great increase in the numbers of
unmarried cohabiting couples" 4 and further recognized that "emotional ties between
unrelated or distantly related persons is often strong [enough that] the result of
injury... may be as devastating as that suffered by a member of the immediate
family."' 85 Despite these realizations, Elden argued the necessity of a bright line rule
because there is no "principled distinction between an unmarried cohabitant who
a de facto marriage.. .and de facto siblings, parents, grandparents or
claims to have
18 6
children."'

180. Id. 18, 66 P.3d at 954.
181. Id. 17, 66 P.3d at 954.
182. Id. 20, 66 P.3d at 954-55.
183. See Butcher, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503, and Elden, 758 P.2d 582, cited in Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 17, 66
P.3d at 954. The court also referred to Trombley as an example of "thoughtful" case law on the question of
consortium for unmarried cohabitants. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 9 17, 66 P.3d at 954. Trombley did not decide
whether unmarried cohabitants should be allowed to bring consortium claims but showed the strength of the debate
on the issue with reference to arguments from the leading case law on the question from Butcher and Elden.
Trombley, 3 P.3d at 922-23.
184. Elden, 758 P.2d at 585-86.
185. Id. at 588.
186. Id.
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Elden referred to Prosser to emphasize the fundamental importance of limiting
the scope of tort liability to prevent "an entirely unreasonable burden on all human
activity."' 87 Prosser cautioned that emotional injuries pose a special concern that a
defendant's liability could grow beyond any clear bounds:
[I]f recovery [for mental distress] is to be permitted, there must be some
limitation .... [One] defendant [should not] be compelled to pay for the lacerated
feelings of every other person disturbed [by the endangerment of one man]
including every bystander... every distant relative of the person injured as well
as his friends.'
Elden contained the consortium claim with a formalistic approach that avoided
looking to relationships themselves for the criteria that could limit growth of the
claim. Elden strictly limited consortium to married partners and left no door open
to other family members or to members of a broader range of spouse/partner
relationships.189
Although Elden overruled Butcher because Butcher did not limit consortium to
married partners, both cases took a more conservative approach to concerns about
expansion of the claim than the New Mexico court has taken. Butcher opened the
claim to unmarried cohabitants based on the understanding that only "spousal... in
kind" relationships warranted consortium.190 Butcher adhered to a California ruling
that did not allow children to make a consortium claim for the loss of a mother
because it found that consortium applied to relationships that are "different in kind
from" parental-child relationships. 9'
Even Butcher's broader view of the term "spouse," however, became too limited
a rule for New Mexico after Fernandez. In contrast to Butcher and Elden, Lozoya
considered expansion of the consortium claim in the context of a rule that had
already extended the cause of action beyond the marital relationship. Fernandez
produced a rule that would recognize the claim, even for a person unrelated by
marriage or blood, as long as the claimant "was a family caretaker and provider of
parental affection [to a minor child]."' 92 Fernandez emphasized that the injury
compensated by consortium "arises from [the] unique relationship with the victim
(and not... family title).' 93 The Fernandez court decided to recognize consortium
for a grandmother who was caretaker to the victim, her minor grandchild, because
"it is not uncommon for several generations of a family to live in the same home [in

187. WILAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, 353-54 (3d ed. 1964), quoted in Elden,
758 P.2d at 588.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 590.
190. Butcher, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 511, overruled by Elden, 758 P.2d at 954.
191. Id. at 508 (citing Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858 (1977)). Butcher limited the claim to stable
and significant sexual relationships. See id. at 512. As a result, Butcher left an opening for consortium claims
brought by plaintiffs from a range of "spousal relationships" but excluded claims by other kinds of family members.
Id. at 511. In contrast to Butcher, the Lozoya rule did not define spouse/partners in terms of sexual relationship.
192. Fernandez, 1998-NMSC-039, 33, 968 P.2d at 784.
193. Id. 1 27, 968 P.2d at 782. Fernandez came after New Mexico's decision to extend NIED claims to
"persons who occupy a legitimate position in loco parentis." Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825 (1983),
overruled in partby Folz, 110 N.M. at 460, 797 P.2d at 249.
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New Mexico]."' 94 In addition, Fernandez interpreted close family relationship to
include persons who functioned as a particular type of family member despite the
absence of a marriage or blood tie.195 Although a grandmother recovered for the loss
of her grandchild in Fernandez,
other claimants in the same familial caretaker role
96
could have recovered. 1
In Lozoya, the New Mexico court reflected agreement with the principle from
both Fernandez and Butcher that looking to the facts of relationships as they
actually exist is the best way to set the standard for containing the consortium claim.
Citing the "widespread reality.. .of unmarried cohabitation,"'' 97 both Butcher and
Lozoya opted not to rely on an arbitrary standard such as marital status.198 Butcher
provided a list of factors that help to assess the actual quality of relationships:
"duration of the relationship; whether the parties have a mutual contract; the degree
of economic cooperation and entanglement; exclusivity of sexual relations; whether
there is a 'family' relationship with children."' 99 The New Mexico court relied on
Dunphy for a similar list of factors. 2°
The Lozoya Defendants' argument that most graphically warned against giving
up a bright line rule to limit the claim concluded that "cousins, co-workers, drinking
buddies,... softball team[mates]," and adulterous lovers could make consortium
claims if genuineness of the emotional loss is the determining factor. 20' This position
echoed the Defendants in Butcher as well as the view expressed in Elden: there is
no "principled way" to distinguish between de facto spouses and all other kinds of
relationships that can be described in terms of de facto family relationships, e.g., de
facto mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers.2 2
The New Mexico court expressed its concern that defendants should not be
burdened by multiple claims in consortium actions,20 3 but both Fernandez and
Lozoya show the court's primary interest is to compensate for the actual loss. The
Lozoya court observed that the "use of legal status necessarily excludes many
persons whose loss of a significant relational interest may be just as devastating as
the loss of a legal spouse. '' 2°' The court concluded that it served "the interests of

194. Fernandez, 1998-NMSC-039, 31, 968 P.2d at 784.
195. Id. 1 32, 968 P.2d at 784 ("It is foreseeable that a negligent actor may cause harm or injury to a minor
child's caretaker and provider of parental affection."); see Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825 (including
"persons who occupy a legitimate position in loco parentis" in its listing of intimate family members eligible for
NIED) (emphasis added).
196. Between Fernandez and Ramirez, New Mexico consortium law and NIED law correspond in their
positions on familial caretakers. As long as a claimant functioned as a parent, both causes of action are available
when the minor child in their care is severely injured or killed due to negligence. Compare Ramirez, 100 N.M. at
541-42, 673 P.2d at 825-26, with Fernandez, 1998-NMSC-039, T 32, 968 P.2d at 784. Lozoya may result in a
similar correspondence between spouse/partner relationships under New Mexico NIED and consortium law.
197. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 26, 66 P.3d at 957 (quoting Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 280, 758 P.2d at 591
(Broussard, J., dissenting)).
198. Butcher, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 510-11, overruled by Elden, 758 P.2d at 590.
199. Id. at 512.
200. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 9 27, 66 P.3d at 957.
201. Id. T 20, 66 P.3d at 954-55.
202. Elden, 758 P.2d at 588; see Butcher, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
203. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 9129, 66 P.3d at 958.
204. Id. 9120, 66 P.3d at 955.
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justice" more to prevent arbitrary exclusions of plaintiffs who have suffered real loss
than to have an easy rule.20 5
The Lozoya court continued the Fernandezapproach, focusing on the actual loss
rather than family titles or legal status. 2' Lozoya balanced the need to limit the
scope of liability with its interest in responding to actual loss in two ways: (1) by
shifting the objective basis for the consortium claim from legal status to a
combination of facts that demonstrate the quality of relationships and (2) by further
limiting the reach of the Lozoya rule to certain kinds of spouse/partners. To shift the
objective standard of the claim from legal status to specific facts about relationships,
the court gave juries a bigger role in determining "imposition of a duty. 20 7 Greater
reliance on the jury, "with proper2 guidance
from the court, ' 20 8 allows for a fact9
based assessment of relationships. 0
Both Butcher and Elden suggested the route that the Lozoya court used to guide
juries in their determinations. Butcher suggested the use of a list of factors that
describes the quality of relationships. 2 0 The Lozoya court turned to Dunphy, an
NIED case, for its list of factors based on Elden' s reference to an equation between
NIED and consortium cases. 2" As noted in Lozoya, Elden found that some of the
same policy arguments apply to both consortium and NIED cases.212 Holding that
unmarried partners would have access to NIED claims in New Jersey, Dunphy relied
on fact-based assessments by juries to determine which relationships warranted the
claim.
Courts have generally recognized a broader range of plaintiffs for NIED claims
than for loss of consortium claims.21 3 Dunphy referred to a series of cases that
allowed NIED claims to plaintiffs who were neither married nor related by blood.21 4
Although the Lozoya court equated NIED and consortium claims in the sense that
they both evaluate the relationship between the tort victim and claimant, 2 5 reliance
on the logic of Dunphy' s NIED rule as a basis for extending the consortium claim
raises an issue about the court's view of New Mexico's NIED rule. Lozoya has
liberalized New Mexico's consortium rule with reliance on the New Jersey NIED
rule that is also more liberal than the New Mexico NIED rule. This suggests the

205. Id.
206. See id. 19, 66 P.3d at 954 (citing Fernandez, 1998-NMSC-039, 968 P.2d 774).
207. Id. 1 21, 66 P.3d at 955.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Butcher, 188 Cal. Rptr. at512.
211. Id. 1 21, 66 P.3d at 955-56 (citing Elden, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582). The court likely preferred to
derive its list from Dunphy, in part because Butcher was overruled.
212. Elden, 758 P.2d 582, cited in Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 66 P.3d at 955-56.
213. New Mexico's NIED rule allows parents, children, siblings, grandparents, grandchildren, and persons
in legitimate positions of in loco parentis to bring the NIED claim. Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541,673 P.2d at825. The
consortium rule has not been as broad as the NIED rule. Compare Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Relationship Between
Victim and Plaintiff-Witness as Affecting Right to Recover Under State Law for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress Due to Witnessing Injury to Another Where Bystander PlaintiffIs Not Member of Victim's Immediate
Family, 98 A.L.R. 5th 609 (2003) (showing that, as a general rule, siblings, children, and parents have consistently
been able to bring NIED claims, as well as some other kinds of plaintiffs who are not immediate family members)
with history of consortium law noted infra this section.
214. See Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 379-80.
215. See Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 21, 66 P.3d at 955.
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possibility that the court will change the relationship requirement of the New
Mexico NIED rule to mirror Dunphy's acceptance of claims by unmarried
partners. 1 6

To limit the Lozoya rule to certain kinds of spouses/partners, the Lozoya court
designed a test that only addressed relationships between couples. First, the court
established three categories of couples that have presumed close family relationships
under the rule (couples "engaged, married, or [meeting] the general test for common
law marriage"). 1 7 Second, the court required that couples that do not qualify for the
presumption have to prove intimate familial relationship by showing an exclusive,
committed relationship to the victim that only one plaintiff could claim. 2" These
provisions clearly tailor the new rule to spouse/partner relationships, not an
unlimited range of potential plaintiffs.2 1 9

216. See infra notes 252-255 and accompanying text, where this implication is discussed in more detail.
Lozoya's reliance on Dunphy brings up a possible problem with applying the rationale for extending the limits of
the NIED cause of action to consortium claims. As an NIED case, Dunphy included a lengthy analysis of the
development of NIED law in California and New Jersey, two Dillon jurisdictions. Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 373-76.
New Mexico is also a Dillon jurisdiction. Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825 (citing Dillon v. Legg, 441
P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), overruled in part by Folz, 110 N.M. at 460, 797 P.2d at 249). Dillon jurisdictions use a multipart NIED rule in which the relationship between the tort victim and the bystander claimant is only one element.
Id. The Dunphy court reasoned that New Jersey could allow unmarried cohabitants to make the NIED claim because
the other prongs of the multi-part NIED test would serve to limit expansion of the cause of action. Dunphy, 642
A.2d at 376. Dunphy further reasoned that California had interpreted all prongs of Dillon so liberally that the Elden
court had to deny NIED claims to unmarried cohabitants to rein in the unreasonable expansion of the cause of action
in California. Id. at 375. Dunphy contrasted New Jersey's conservative application of its NIED rule with the
California experience. Id. at 375-76. Dunphy described its approach to NIED claims as a "'sedulous application'
of [tort] principles" that eschewed arbitrary bright line roles. Id. at 376. Dunphy emphasized the precise assessment
of the facts about relationships and fairness considerations over the need for policy constraints on overbroad
liability. Id. Dunphy's reliance on the multiple prongs of the NED rule to contain the growth of the NIED cause
of action, see id. at 375, however, suggests that the Dunphy court would not necessarily be inclined to expand the
consortium cause of action in the same way. Consortium claims do not have the same built-in limits that are
available under the Dillon NIED role. Notably, after Dunphy, a federal court applying New Jersey law did not
extend loss of consortium to unmarried cohabitants. Smith v. Bell Sports, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 70, 78-79 (W.D.N.Y.
1996).
217. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009,1 29, 66 P.3d at 958.
218. See id.
219. Despite the supreme court's intention to apply the Lozoya test only to couples either presumed or found
to meet the three basic relationship requirements that apply to spouses/partners, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
interpreted the Lozoya test as applicable to all kinds of consortium plaintiffs. See Fitzjerrell v. City of Gallup, 2003NMCA-125, 79 P.3d 836 (holding that parents and siblings of a deceased adult were allowed to bring claims for
loss of consortium). The court of appeals relied on Fernandezand Lozoya to hold that bringing a loss of consortium
claim depends on an intimate familial relationship and the jury's assessment of the Dunphy factors. Id. 14,79 P.3d
at 841. The court of appeals, however, did not take into account the three Lozoya relationship requirements that limit
the rule to spouses/partners. Id. 19, 79 P.3d at 839. Fit4jerrelllisted the Dunphy factors and concluded that the New
Mexico Supreme Court made it clear "that a relationship that creates a compensable interest [for loss of consortium]
is intimate, protective, interdependent, and intertwined in functional.. .and temporal ways.....Id. The court of
appeals correctly picked up on Lozoya's observation that imposition of duty is often dependent on fact
determinations made by juries. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 21, 66 P.3d 955-56 (citing Sarracino v. Martinez, 117
N.M. 193, 194,870 P.2d 155, 156-57 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994)). Lozoya, however, set out narrow circumstances under
which jury determinations on the imposition of duty in loss of consortium claims would be required. Lozoya's
discussion of the presumption and three "further limits" under the rule showed that the court did not expect that all
consortium plaintiffs would have their claims reach juries for consideration of Dunphy factors. See id. Ij 27-29,
66 P.3d at 957-58.
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B. The Need for Fairand ConsistentMarriagePolicy
Overall, the Lozoya rationale placed less emphasis on marriage policy issues than
it gave to concerns about the scope of liability and its ultimate conclusion that legal
recognition of relationships as they actually exist takes priority over an easy-tomanage rule. The court, however, addressed three marriage policy issues. First, the
Lozoya court rebutted the argument that it would be unfair to allow an unmarried
cohabitant to bring a consortium claim because it would involve giving a benefit of
marriage to a plaintiff who had not assumed the burdens of marriage. 2 ° Second, the
Lozoya court rebutted the argument that recognition of unmarried cohabitants would
contradict New Mexico state policy that does not recognize common law
marriage.22 ' The Lozoya court made minor mention of a third marriage policy
argument that the state has a general interest in the protection of the legal interest
of marriage.222
The Lozoya Defendants raised arguments on marriage policy that came up in
Elden.223 The court's responses resonated with the Elden dissent. The first of the
three marriage policy issues that came up in Lozoya was framed in terms of basic
fairness. 224 As in Elden, the Lozoya Defendants asserted that it would be unfair for
Sara Lozoya to reap a benefit of marriage, the right to bring a consortium claim,
without undertaking the obligations of marriage.22' Elden cited a series of marriage
and divorce statutes, as well as laws imposing legal duties on married partners, that
led it to find that a married partner who has followed these laws should recover to
a greater extent for the loss of their spouse than an unmarried claimant should
recover for the loss of a partner.226
The Lozoya court arrived at a different conclusion by rejecting the notion that the
right to bring a consortium claim is a benefit of marriage. 27 Lozoya agreed with the
Elden dissent that it is highly improbable that the right to a legal cause of action for
22 8
the loss of a spouse is any kind of incentive to marry, never mind a benefit.
Lozoya answered this argument in a second way, repeating another point from the
Elden dissent, observing that unmarried partners are deprived of both the burdens
and the corresponding benefits of marriage. 29 In fact, the New Mexico court has not
defined consortium as a benefit for any kind of relationship, marital or not. Lozoya
defined consortium as "a method of compensation for one who has suffered the loss
of a significant relational interest," not a marital right.2 30 In the New Mexico court,

220. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 1 22-23, 66 P.3d at 956.
221. Id. 24-25, 66 P.3d at 956-57.
222. Id. 20, 66 P.3d at 955.
223. Butcher, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 512, overruledby Elden, 758 P.2d at 590. The state marriage policy argument
addressed in Butcher related to California's workers' compensation statute. See id. at 511-12. Butcher rejected use
of the workers' compensation law as guidance for the consortium claim. Id. at 512.
224. Elden, 758 P.2d at 587.
225. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, H 18, 22-23, 66 P.3d at 954, 956.
226. Elden, 758 P.2d at 587.
227. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 23, 66 P.3d at 956.
228. Elden, 758 P.2d at 591 (Broussard, J., dissenting); Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009,1 20, 66 P. 3d at 954-55.
229. Elden, 758 P.2d at 592 (Broussard, J., dissenting); see also Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 23, 66 P.3d at
956.
230. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 123, 66 P.3d at 956.
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Fernandez had already defined consortium as a relational interest that extends
beyond marriage.23 '
The Lozoya Defendants raised a second marriage policy issue that came up in
Elden, that giving unmarried cohabitant couples standing for consortium and NIED
claims violated the state's policy against common law marriage. 32 Elden explained
that California's policy in favor of formal marriage was evident in the legislature's
decision to abolish common law marriage 233 and ruled against recognition of
unmarried cohabitants, in part to uphold the legislature's policy.
The Lozoya court dealt with this issue without fleshing out the related policy
arguments.2 34 Again, the New Mexico court relied on reference to an academic
article for implicit policy support. The court noted that an academic article by
Cynthia Bowman favored the return of common law marriage to enable consortium
claims by unmarried couples. 235 The court emphasized that Lozoya does not upset
New Mexico's non-recognition of common law marriage.236 At the same time,
Lozoya included a standard for common law marriage in its formulation of the
Lozoya test as a basis for adding weight to a claim by an unmarried couple.2 37 The
court acknowledged that "problems may arise in the future" as a result of using a
common law marriage requirement as part of its new test. 238 The court, however,
placed fairness ahead of the concern that use of the common law marriage test will
create difficulties.
Although the court barely mentioned the third marriage policy point, the state's
interest in marriage, it is noteworthy to contrast the approach taken to this argument
with Elden. Elden put a spin on this issue by promoting a particular concept 23of9
marriage rather than simply protection of the legal interests associated with it.
Elden cited Nieto v. City ofLos Angeles,24° a California wrongful death decision that
included a lengthy justification for the state's refusal to offer the same
"solicitous[ness]" to unmarried partners that it showed to married spouses.24' In
Nieto, a California Court of Appeals reasoned that the state is solicitous of marriage
because "'the joining of the man and woman in marriage is at once the most socially

231. Fernandez, 1998-NMSC-039, 33, 968 P.2d at 784.
232. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 24, 66 P.3d at 956; Elden, 758 P.2d at 587.
233. Elden, 758 P.2d at 587.
234. See Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 1 25, 28, 66 P.3d at 956-57.
235. Id. 1 25, 66 P.3d at 957 (citing Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common
Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 764-65 (1996) ("arguing that states which have abolished common law
marriage should return to recognizing it, so that loss of consortium claims would not be inhibited")).
236. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 24, 66 P.3d at 956. The court cited case law as the authority for New
Mexico's nonrecognition of common law marriage. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
237. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 91[
24-25, 28, 66 P.3d at 956-58.
238. Id. 9128, 66 P.3d at 957. Notably, the Elden dissent, in part, addressed the issue of common law marriage
in terms of the argument that the state has an interest in supporting formal marriages. Elden, 758 P.2d at 591
(Broussard, J., dissenting). In response, the Elden dissent observed that unmarried partnerships serve the same social
functions as marital relationships. Elden, 758 P.2d at 591 n. 1 (Broussard, J., dissenting). The Elden dissent further
commented that the exclusion of same sex couples from consortium and NIED claims would be a clear injustice.
Id. at 592 n.2 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
239. See Elden, 758 P.2d at586-87 (quoting Nieto v. City of Los Angeles, 188 Cal. Rptr. 31 (Ct. App. 1982)).
240. 188 Cal. Rptr. 31 (Ct. App. 1982).
241. Id. at 34.
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productive and individually fulfilling relationship that one can enjoy in the course
of a lifetime." 242
Unlike Elden, Lozoya characterized the state's interest in marriage in terms of
legal interests rather than beliefs. Lozoya referred to protection of the legal interest
of marriage without describing a state interest in protecting or promoting a particular
concept of the marital relationship. In addition, Lozoya referred to the Barbara Cox
article that offered a different perspective on marriage and family than quoted in
Elden and Nieto.243 The court specifically cited Cox's analysis of Butcher on the
merits of extending consortium to unmarried cohabitants. 2" The context of Cox's
analysis, however, was that alternative families are also worthy of protection under
the law.245 Cox's premise was that even families that are not based on marriage
between a husband and wife promote family values. 246 As part of her argument that
marriage is not essential to the promotion of family247values, Cox included same sex
248
couples in her definition of alternative families. Lozoya's reliance on Cox
shows that the New Mexico court's view of family is very different than the view
expressed in Elden and Nieto.249
Finally, given the extent of Lozoya's reliance on Dunphy, the Dunphy court's
conclusions on the state's interest in marriage are likely to have resonated with the
New Mexico court. Not having met a pointed argument on the issue, the New
Mexico court found it sufficient to affirm the state's interest in protection of the
legal rights of marriage. Dunphy, however, squarely rejected the argument that the
state's interest in marriage was threatened by legal recognition of an intimate
familial relationship between unmarried spouses, noting that "[m]arriage will still
maintain its preferential status under the law" despite the ability of unmarried
cohabitants to bring NIED claims. 250 Dunphy further observed that protection of the
intimate relational interest for certain unmarried couples "will not discourage
marriage as a worthwhile and desirable
relationship or erode society's commitment
25
to the institution of marriage. 1
V. IMPLICATIONS
A. A Change to the Relationship Requirement of the New Mexico NIED Rule
Lozoya applied out of state NIED law to liberalize the New Mexico consortium
rule. The court turned to the more liberal view of intimate family relationship found

242. Id.
243. Cox, supra note 60.
244. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 1 17, 66 P.3d at 954 (citing Cox, supra note 60).
245. See Cox, supra note 60, at 95-97.
246. Id. at 96-97.
247. Id. at 95.
248. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 1 17, 66 P.3d at 954.
249. The Elden dissent countered the California court's acclamation of marriage with the observation that
traditional marriage serves a particular set of values and functions that can flourish "to the same extent" in
relationships between unmarried partners. Elden, 758 P.2d at 591 (Broussard, J., dissenting). This view suggested
that the intrinsic value of a committed, intimate relationship is a higher priority for society than the preservation of
the institution of marriage itself. Justice Broussard further observed that the belief that "only married couples can
create families which promote society's interests [is untenable]." Id.
250. Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 379.
251. Id.
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in Dunphy, an NIED case. Lozoya could not rely on New Mexico NIED law because
it does not reflect the liberalized view of intimate family relationship the court has
now embraced. Lozoya's extensive use of Dunphy to make the case that unmarried
couples should be able bring consortium claims strongly suggests that the court may
now be open to changing the New Mexico NIED rule, allowing unmarried couples
to bring NIED claims.
The current relationship prong of the New Mexico NIED rule requires an intimate
familial relationship between the victim and the plaintiff but limits recovery to
certain family members. 2 One way to achieve consistency between consortium and
NIED would be for New Mexico to match Dunphy's NIED relationship prong that
simply requires "a marital or intimate, familial relationship between the plaintiff and
the injured person. 253
In its simplified form, the New Mexico NIED rule's relationship requirement
would cover all three categories of Lozoya claimants eligible for the presumption of
intimate family relationship: couples "engaged, married, or [meeting] the general
test for common law marriage. '254 It would also cover couples that do not fit into
these categories as long as they can prove the presence of an intimate family
relationship by showing an exclusive, committed relationship with the victim that
only one plaintiff could claim. 255 Another way to achieve consistency between the
Lozoya consortium rule and the NIED rule would be to add a category to the limited
list of intimate family members that can recover NIED under the current New
Mexico rule. As spouses are already listed, the new category would be unmarried
couples with an intimate family relationship.
Using one of these approaches, the NIED rule would mirror Lozoya' s recognition
of the existing range of spouse/partner relationships. Such an approach mirrors the
recognition in Fernandezthat there is a range of family members that take familial
caretaker roles. Both NLED and consortium rules would be logically consistent in
showing the court's preference to compensate actual loss by recognizing
relationships as they actually exist.
B. Recognition of Same Sex Couplesfor Consortium Claims in New Mexico
To recapitulate, the three categories of Lozoya plaintiffs eligible for the
presumption of intimate family relationship are couples "engaged, married, or
[meeting] the general test for common law marriage. 2 6 Given that the court did not
disqualify same sex couples either from bringing claims or from the presumption of
intimate family relationship, some same sex couples may fit into these three
categories.
Legal developments across the country have increased the likelihood that
members of same sex couples will bring consortium claims in New Mexico based
on marriage, civil unions, or engagement. Vermont provides a civil union for same

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541-42, 673 P.2d at 825-26.
Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 374.
Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 29, 66 P.3d at 958.
Id.
Id.
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sex couples that is legally equivalent to marriage under Vermont law.257 In
Goodridge v. Departmentof PublicHealth,258 the Massachusetts court ruled that the
state is compelled by its constitution to provide marriage licenses to same sex
couples.259 On May 17, 2004, same sex couples acquired the right to marry in
Massachusetts. 2 ° In opposition to California state law, the mayor of San Francisco
authorized issuance of more than 4161 marriage licenses to same sex partners.26'
Sandoval County, New Mexico, granted marriage licenses to twenty-six same sex
couples before the state attorney general issued an advisory opinion that the
marriages would be null and void under state law.262 Multnomah County, Portland,
Oregon, has granted licenses to 3000 same sex couples.263 The county continues to
issue licenses to same sex couples based on the state attorney general's opinion that
state law prohibiting same sex marriages violates the Oregon constitution. The high
courts in three Canadian provinces, British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec, have
ruled that Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms allows marriage to same sex

257. Culhane, supra note 155, at 938 n.298 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201(2) (2003) (stating that
parties to a civil union "may receive the benefits and protections and be subject to the responsibilities of spouses");
§ 1204(a) (stating that civil union confers "all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether
they derive from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are
granted to spouses in a marriage")). Vermont changed over a thousand state laws to accommodate the civil union
statute. Joanna Grossman, The New Jersey Domestic Partnership Law (Jan. 13, 2004), available at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20040113.html. At least one state, New York, has already recognized a tort
claim by the surviving partner from a Vermont civil union in Langan v. St. Vincent's Hospital of New York, 765
N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
258. 798 N.Ed.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
259. Id. at 1069 (holding there was no state constitutional basis for depriving a same sex couple of the rights
of marriage); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas statute banning sodomy and
overruling Bowers v. Hardwick,478 U.S. 186 (1986), which upheld the Texas sodomy statute and served to support
the withholding of legal protection from homosexuals).
260. Ron DePasquale, Romney Among Key Figures Invited to Nuptials, BOSTON GLOBE, May 17, 2004, at
B4. On August 18, 2004, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld a 1913 state law "which denies out-ofstate couples the right to marry in Massachusetts if the union would be deemed invalid in their home state." Scott
S. Greenberger, Ruling Backs Law RestrictingMarriage,BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 19, 2004, at B 1. The Massachusetts
legislature voted for a proposed amendment to the state constitution that would ban gay marriage but allow civil
unions. Pam Belluck, Setback Is Dealtto Gay Marriage,N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 30, 2004, at Al. This amendment cannot
take effect until, at the earliest, 2006, and only then if the proposal passes again in the next legislative session and
in a public referendum. Id.
261. Evelyn Nieves, CaliforniaHigh Court Halts Gay Marriages,WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2004, at Al. The
California Supreme Court nullified all these same sex marriages. Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, 2004
Ca. LEXIS 7238, Aug. 12, 2004. The court, however, emphasized."the substantive question of the constitutional
validity of California's statutory provisions limiting marriage to a union between a man and a woman is not before
the court in this proceeding." Id. at 10. The constitutional question "is working its way through the California courts
in Woo v. Lockyer." Alan Cooperman, Gay Rights Activists Weigh Tactics of MarriagePush, WASH. POST, Aug.
13, 2004.
262. Dean E. Murphy, San FranciscoJudge Rules Gay MarriageCan Continue, N.Y. TMES, Feb. 20, 2004,
at A8. The advisory opinion may be challenged as an inaccurate statement of New Mexico marriage law. The New
Mexico marriage statute is gender neutral: "Marriage is contemplated by the law as a civil contract, for which the
consent of the contracting parties, capable in law of contracting, is essential." NMSA 1978, § 40-1-1 (1953).
263. Bob Egelko, Judge Halts Same Sex Marriagesin Oregon but He OrdersState to Validate3,000 Licenses
Already Issued, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 21, 2004, at A3. In July 2004, the Oregon Supreme Court agreed to hear a
constitutional challenge to the Oregon marriage statute. Basic Rights Oregon and nine Oregon couples filed a suit
against the State claiming the statute discriminates on the basis of gender and sexual orientation. See Basic Rights
Oregon, Oregon Supreme Court Takes Marriage Case (July 30, 2004), at http://www.basicrights.org/
news/newsarchive.asp.
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couples.2 64 The Netherlands and Belgium also allow for gay marriages. 265 All these
developments could lead to consortium claims by same sex partners in New Mexico
joined in civil unions or married out of the state or country.
Even if the court would not recognize a marriage or civil union for same sex
partners, the Lozoya rule provided another route that same sex couples could readily
use. Couples not engaged, married, or meeting the common law marriage test can
bring consortium claims if they can prove the three basic relationship requirements:
266
an exclusive, committed relationship that only one plaintiff can claim.
Four aspects of the Lozoya rationale show that the New Mexico court anticipated
loss of consortium claims for same sex couples. First, the court did not preclude
same sex couples from bringing loss of consortium claims. Second, the court defined
multiple categories of couples that can bring the consortium claim under the Lozoya
rule in gender-neutral language that would readily include same sex partners. 267 This
gender-neutral language allows some same sex couples to claim marriage or
engagement under Lozoya and expect to get the presumption of intimate familial
relationship or bring the loss of consortium claim based on satisfaction of the three
relationship requirements. 26 8 Third, the court noted that the Barbara Cox article had
helped convince it to extend consortium to unmarried cohabitants. 269 The central
argument in the Cox article is that alternative families, defined to include gay and
lesbian partners, should have all of the legal protections given to traditional
families. 270 Lastly, the court relied on the Elden dissent for its arguments on
marriage policy. 271 In the context of its marriage argument, the Elden dissent
expressly described the injustice of a consortium rule that would preclude recovery
for same sex couples.272
In addition to these features of Lozoya, there are arguments from developments
in statutory and case law across the country that favor consortium claims by same

264. Colin Campbell, Quebec Court Upholds Gay Marriage,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004, at A5 (reporting
decision by Quebec Court of Appeal to uphold ruling that traditional definition of marriage is discriminatory and
unjustified); see Hendricks v. Canada, 131 A.C. W.S. (3d) 705 (2004); EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada, 107 C.R.R.
(2d) 51 (2003); Halpem v. Canada, 123 A.C. W.S. (3d) 319 (2003).
265. Developments in the Law: II. Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of SameSex Marriagein the UnitedStates and Europe, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2004, 2007 (2003) [hereinafter Developments].
266. Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 29, 66 P.3d at 958.
267. Id. 27, 66 P.3d at 957.
268. Id. 29, 66 P.3d at 958.
269. Id. 17, 66 P.3d at 954 (citing Cox, supra note 60, at 133-37). Lozoya referred to the Elden dissent's
observation of "the widespread reality and acceptance of unmarried cohabitation." Elden, 758 P.2d at 591
(Broussard, J., dissenting), quoted in Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009, 26,66 P.3d at 957. In line with the court's interest
in responding to relationships as they actually exist, note that the 2000 Census data ranked Santa Fe, New Mexico,
second in the top twenty-five metropolitan areas with coupled households that are gay and lesbian. DAVID M. SMITH
& GRAY G. GATES, GAY AND LESBIAN FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES: SAME SEX UNMARRIED PARTNER
HOUSEHOLDS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF 2000 UNITED STATES CENSUS DATA, A HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN

REPORT 7 (Aug. 22, 2001); see also Shea Andersen, Gays Put Duke City on the Map, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Apr.
14, 2004, at Al, available at http://www.abqtrib.com/archives/news04/041404_news-gay.shtml (announcing
upcoming publication of the Gay and Lesbian Atlas by the Urban Institute that provides an account of the 2000 U.S.
Census data ranking Albuquerque, New Mexico, "in the top ten cities with high concentrations of same sex
households....").
270. Cox, supra note 60, at 94-97.
271. See supra notes 223-249 and accompanying text.
272. Elden, 758 P.2d at 592 n.2 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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sex couples. Vermont law allows couples from civil unions to bring tort claims 273
and Hawaii has passed a wrongful death statute that allows same sex couples to
bring tort claims. 4 Functional definitions of family have resulted in greater legal
protections for same sex couples in many fields of the common law. Same sex
partners can claim worker's compensation, "assume certain parental rights," be
liable for child support, assume guardianship for a disabled partner, be subject to
domestic violence laws, form private marriage contracts, "assume one another's last
names, and... contest inheritance rights. 275
An especially interesting feature of this favorable case law is that same sex
partners are winning certain parental rights.276 One of the leading arguments for
traditional marriage is that it creates the most favorable environment for child
rearing.277 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health recognized that marriage
"provides a cornucopia of substantial benefits to married parents and their children"
based on the belief that "marriage 'is the foremost setting for the education and
socialization of children. "278 Goodridge reached its holding that same sex couples
should have the right to marry, in part because the children of same sex parents
should have equal advantages to the children of opposite sex parents:
[W]e are confronted with an entire, sizeable class of parents raising children who
have absolutely no access to civil marriage and its protections because they are
forbidden from procuring a marriage license. It cannot be rational under our
laws, and indeed it is not permitted, to penalize children by depriving them of
State benefits because the State disapproves of their parents' sexual
orientation. 9

Despite these developments that favor same sex couples, tort law has lagged
behind.28 ° The fact that so many other areas of the common law are recognizing the

273. Culhane, supranote 155, at 938-39.
274. Grossman, supranote 257. California and New Jersey have statutes that recognize domestic partnerships,
but these statutes provide far fewer legal protections than the Vermont civil union. Id.
275. Developments, supra note 262, at 2022-23.
276. ld. at 2021.
277. Tony Perkins, State of the Family 2004 Address, available at www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=AR04A028v=PRINT (last visited Apr. 11, 2004). Perkins stated, "Marriage is ... the safest place for women and children.
According to a study by the Heritage Foundation, children from broken or never-married families have greater rates
of long-term poverty, serious child abuse, developmental and behavioral problems, and are more likely to end up
in jail as adults." Id.
278. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 964.
279. Id.
280. Culhane, supranote 155. Culhane referred to tort law's "clanging silence" regarding same sex partners.
Id. There are, however, at least two successful wrongful death claims based on same sex partnerships: Langan v.
St. Vincent's Hospitalof New York and Solomon v. D.C. See Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (allowing a wrongful death
claim to the surviving partner of a Vermont civil union); Culhane, supra note 155, at 967-68 (citing Solomon, 21
FAM. L. REP.(BNA) 1305 (D.C. Super. Ct., No. 94-2709, Apr. 26, 1995)) (holding plaintiff could recover for the
wrongful death of her lesbian partner). Culhane noted that Solomon extended the claim by interpreting the statute's
term "next of kin" to include the lesbian partner. Culhane, supra note 155, at 967-68. Culhane further pointed out
that the statute provided a complete list of next of kin that did not include a category for unmarried partners. He
observed that the court stretched its reading of the term "next of kin" but did not consider expanding its
interpretation of "spouse." Id. Culhane further noted that the economic focus of the wrongful death claim accounts
for the somewhat greater willingness of courts to allow these actions by same sex partners. Id. This was consistent
with Culhane's thesis that courts avoid addressing sexual intimacy between same sex partners. Culhane, supra note
155, at 967.
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practical need to respond to the reality of same sex partnerships suggests that courts
will be willing to apply Lozoya without discriminating against same sex couples.
The obstacles to consortium claims by same sex couples in New Mexico come
from policy arguments based on federal and state interests in marriage. The debate
about the state's interest in marriage found in Butcher, Elden, and Dunphy would
likely be revisited. The current divisive national political controversy over same sex
marriage would certainly add fuel to these arguments. The federal Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) and the proliferation of state enacted DOMAs would likely
come up in response to arguments detailing the favorable developments in the
law.28'
In Langan v. St. Vincent's Hospitalof New York, however, the fact that New York
had not passed a state DOMA helped to prove the plaintiff s claim that New York
state policy favored legal protection of same sex couples joined in a Vermont civil
union. 8 2 The absence of a state DOMA in New Mexico could favor the surviving
partner of a Vermont civil union, or out-of-state gay marriage.283 It could also favor
same sex couples not claiming marriage but arguing that New Mexico state policy
tends to grant rather than deprive same sex couples of legal protections.
Furthermore, New Mexico law supports the argument that the state has a policy
interest in greater legal protection of same sex partners. First, New Mexico law
honors out of state marriages.284 Second, as noted before, New Mexico has not
passed a state version of the federal DOMA.285 Additionally, the trend in New
Mexico law is to extend legal protections to same sex partners: (1) There is no
exemption of same sex marriages or civil unions that equal marriage under another
state's law from the New Mexico statute requiring recognition of out of state
marriages.286 (2) There is no provision of New Mexico law that explicitly prohibits
same sex marriage. 287 New Mexico marriage law is framed in gender-neutral
language.288 (3) An Executive Order dated April 9, 2003, ensures that domestic
289
(4) New
partners of state employees are afforded the same benefits as spouses.

Mexico outlawed "hate crimes.. .committed because of the victim's actual or
281. The federal DOMA defined marriage as a legal bond between a man and a woman and "purported to"
allow states the freedom to withhold full faith and credit for gay marriages performed out of state. Culhane, supra
note 149, at 937 (citing Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at I U.S.C. §
7 (Supp. V 1999); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV 1998))). There are now thirty-eight state DOMAs that follow the
federal example. James Dao, Governor Signs Ban on Gay Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2004, at A12. Colorado,
Utah, Texas, Arizona, and Oklahoma are a few of the states that prohibit in-state gay marriage and recognition of
out-of-state gay marriage. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104(l)(b) (2001); ARIZ.REV. STAT. §§ 25-101-25-112
(2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.103,2.001 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-2,30-1-4 (2002); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 51 § 255 (2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43 § 3.1 (2002). For other state statutes that prohibit in-state gay marriage and recognition of out-of-state gay marriage, see the Human Rights Campaign web site at http://www.hrc.org/
Template.cfm?Section=Your-Community&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDispay.cfm&ContentiD=8471
(last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
282. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
283. Human Rights Campaign Foundation, New Mexico Laws Affecting GLBT People, available at
http://www.hrc.org/index.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
284. NMSA 1978, § 40-1-4 (1953).
285. Id.
286. Human Rights Campaign Foundation, supra note 283.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. (citing Exec. Ord. No. 2003-010 (Apr. 9, 2003)).
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perceived race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, sexual orientation
or gender identity.",290 (5) New Mexico extended non-discrimination law in the state
to categories of sexual orientation and gender identity. 291 (6) New Mexico
"welcomes adoption and foster care by gay and lesbian individuals and couples. 29 2
All of these features of New Mexico law favor members of same sex couples
bringing consortium claims and potentially also NIED claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Lozoya court produced a new consortium rule tailored to claims brought by
couples. The new rule allowed the plaintiffs, unmarried cohabitants, to bring the
consortium claim. At the same time, the new rule created a route for a range of
unmarried partners, including same sex couples, to bring consortium claims and
potentially also NIED claims. In the context of current legal developments favoring
same sex couples in the nation and in New Mexico, it is especially likely that Lozoya
provides a path for same sex couples to bring consortium claims.
Lozoya' s reliance on Dunphy's NIED rule makes for a strong argument that New
Mexico's relationship requirement for NIED should conform to Dunphy and permit
the same spouses/partners now eligible to bring consortium claims to bring NIED
claims as well. This change would favor same sex couples bringing NIED and
consortium claims.
The emphasis of the Lozoya rule is on the quality of intimacy between a couple
making the claim, not the legal status of the relationship. The Lozoya rule contains
expansion of the class of plaintiffs for consortium actions with three restrictive
requirements that limit the claim to couples presenting a particular degree of
intimate relationship. While concerned with containing the claim, the court
maintained a trend in New Mexico consortium law that recognizes intimate family
relationships, as they actually exist, taking into account the cultural realities of the
state. These principles underlie the groundbreaking decisions in Fernandez and
Lozoya and set the stage for further extension of the claim based on these principles.

290. Hate Crimes Act, NMSA 1978, § 31-18B-3 (2003).
291. Human Rights Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 28-1-2, 28-1-7, 28-1-9 (2003).
292. Id. In addition to this policy stated by the Children, Youth and Families Department, New Mexico courts
have placed the best interests of the child first and have not allowed homosexuality or other sexual lifestyle issues,
in themselves, to become a bar to custody and visitation. See In re Jacinta M., 107 N.M. 769, 772, 764 P.2d 1327,
1330 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (holding sexual orientation of a proposed custodian, standing alone, is not enough to
preclude a custodian); A.C. v. C.B., 113 N.M. 581, 585, 829 P.2d 660, 664 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
Petitioner's sexual orientation, standing alone, is not a permissible basis for denial of shared custody or visitation).
In New Mexico, courts have not allowed homosexuality, in itself, to bar custody or visitation.

